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I ESSAY I




Since becoming a judge in 1981, I have wrestled with, and
agonized about, the issues of criminal behavior, punishment, and
sentencing. I believed then that in sentencing criminals, I was
shoveling sand against the tide. Now, more than sixteen years
later, I maintain that belief. Over the course of these years, I have
become convinced that there is a better theory to follow than the
"crime equals punishment" equation that is now so thoroughly
ingrained in our penology, our politics, and our popular culture. I
believe that the failures of this equation require that we embrace
* Richard Lowell Nygaard is a judge with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. The author gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful contributions of his law
clerk, colleague, and friend, Roger G. Schwartz, a truly exceptional individual whose mind
seems never to rest.
1. This essay was presented in lecture form in Erie, Pennsylvania as the first lecture
in The Pennsylvania State University 1997-1998 Lecture Series, and again in Macon, Georgia
as part of the 1997 Middle Georgia Educational Foundation Lecture. This article is the
combination of both lectures, portions of which were omitted from each. Part VII is a
compilation of the questions and answers that followed the lectures. I have included them
because the comments and questions following any lecture are significant, first, because they
give me a "Rorschach"-like insight into my audience, and second, because they indicate what
the audience heard, which is more important than what I said.
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a new philosophy and take a different approach. This new
philosophy, which I call the Skeptic's View, must first and foremost
seek to explain why we sentence criminal offenders and the
purposes we seek to serve by each sentence. Moreover, in applying
this new theory to practice, we must ensure that our actions are
both consistent with the purposes of the theory and that they
advance the social ends we wish to achieve.
Recently there has been a reduction in violent crime. Why?
According to many it is because we have finally committed our
criminal justice system to the simple equation "crime equals
punishment." Under this theory, if an individual commits a crime,
there is but one response-punishment. Thus, the theory goes, as
the crime becomes more serious, the duration of the punishment
should be increased or, perhaps, the offender should be put to
death. One of the ironies of this formula is that many of us-prof-
essionals and laypersons alike-believe that it fully accounts for (1)
why we punish and (2) the purpose behind the decision to punish
offenders. But is it really that easy? I do not think so.
Why do we punish criminal offenders? I suspect many of us
have not thought much about this question. Perhaps this is because
the answer seems clear. Again, I do not think it is. This article
will explore the question: Why do we punish criminal offenders?
My position is that contemporary penal theory does significantly
more harm than is necessary. I believe that the criminal justice
delivery system should strive to produce hope, not despair; that it
should be an instrument of social harmony rather than discord; and,
that it should prescribe remedies for offenders that are not socially
corrosive. This article will consider such deceptively simple
questions as: Why do we punish?; What purpose does punishment
serve?; What are the goals of punishment?; What are the appropri-
ate means of punishment?; and finally, Should we punish at all?
Consider for a moment the following true story as related by
author Robert Penn Warren. In the mid-1930s, Warren attended
a murder trial in Louisiana. The case being tried involved an old
man who had shot a young woman for, as he said, "talking
meanness against his baby-girl daughter."2 The man had shot and
killed the young woman using both barrels of a twelve-gauge
2. Ralph Ellison & Eugene Walter, Warren on the Art of Fiction, in TALKING WITH
ROBERT PENN WARREN 25, 49 (Floyd C. Watkins et al. eds., 1990).
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shotgun at a range of eight feet while she was gambling.3 A dozen
people witnessed the execution.4 Incredibly, before shooting the
young woman, the old man waited thirty minutes on a stump
outside the building where the craps game was taking place because
a friend had asked him to hold off so he could win back six dollars
that he had lost to the condemned victim.5 Once the friend won
the money back, the old man entered the building and "went to
work.",6 Warren's discussion of what subsequently happened is
worth quoting:
He [the old man] never denied what he had done. He ex-
plained it all very carefully, and why he had to do it. He loved
his baby-girl daughter and there wasn't anything else he could
do. Then he would plead "Not Guilty." But if he got tried and
convicted-and they couldn't fail to convict-he would get
death. If, however, he would plead guilty to manslaughter he
could get off light. But he wouldn't do it. He said he wasn't
guilty of anything. The whole town got involved in the thing.
Well, they finally cracked him. He pled guilty and got off light.
Everybody was glad, sure-they weren't stuck with something,
they could feel good and pretty virtuous. But they felt bad, too.
Something had been lost, something a lot of them could
appreciate .... It took him [the old man] three days to crack,
and when he cracked he was nothing. Now, we don't approve
of what he did-a status homicide the sociologists call it, and
that is the worst sort of homicide, worse than homicide for gain,
because status homicide is irrational, and you can't make sense
of it, and it is the mark of a low order of society. But because
status homicide is the mark of a low order of society, what are
we to think about the old man's three-day struggle to keep his
dignity? And are we to deny value to this dignity ... V
What shall we make of this story? It seems simple enough;
one human brutally murdered another for what appears to be no
rational or justifiable reason. Indeed, if we all went around
shooting people "for talking meanness" against someone we loved,
we would find ourselves in a culture that only the Hollywood





7. Ellison & Walker, supra note 2, at 49-50.
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punishment" equation, severe punishment is called for. But wait,
as Warren and the Skeptic's View conclude, it is not that simple.
First, despite the unanimous agreement that the old man has
committed a violent crime, he steadfastly refuses to accept that
what he has done is wrong. Instead, the old man insists that he is
"not guilty." His perspective, in turn, makes the members of his
community uncomfortable because he is, in effect, challenging the
community's collective concept of "right" and "wrong." Indeed,
the old man's refusal to admit or even recognize that his actions
are wrong, cuts to the very foundations of the "crime equals
punishment" equation. We punish in reaction to "wrong" actions.
"Wrongness" is a collective judgment of society, and laws are the
political manifestation of society's collective moral ideals. Here,
however, we are left to wonder: because the old man does not
accept, or believe, that what he has done is "wrong," does his
community lose its desire to avenge the killing of another of its
citizens. If so, what purpose will punishing the old man achieve?
Notice that despite the community's belief that the old man
committed an awful crime, they offer him the option of receiving
a much lighter sentence if he confesses. Indeed, the community
appears to need him to confess. There are two primary reasons,
and perhaps a third ancillary reason, for this need.
First-please follow me philosophically and then in the
penological sense-punishment is ineffective against the offender
who does not recognize the wrongness of his act because punish-
ment then is, to him, an injustice and simply serves to harden his
resolve not to accept blame. The old man's community recognizes
that as does Warren. Second, if the old man confesses, the
community members are reassured that the man's moral perspec-
tive is ostensibly the same as theirs. In other words, if the old man
concedes that his actions were wrong, the community is reassured
that its collective judgment about his act is correct. Thus, its desire
to punish him for his wrongful actions is legitimized.
A culture is less concerned with social or political theory than
with its own insights. People understand the meaning of justice
only when they can relate its demands to the rest of what they
believe to be true about their cultural milieu. Secondarily, by
offering the old man the option of "mercy," the community
expresses its discomfort with the rigidity of the "crime equals
punishment" equation and eases its severity. Even though the old
man has committed a brutal killing, the community believes that he
[Vol. 102:2
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is entitled to some leniency or compassion if he admits his action
was wrong. In this way, the community gets the best of both
worlds. The old man admits his "wrongness"-even if he does not
believe it-and is punished, and the community tailors the
punishment to meet both the particular circumstances of the case
and the community's parallax view of punishment.
But there is more to this lesson: the community feels a sense
of loss when the old man finally confesses. How can this be
explained? My guess is that the members of the community have
a latent grasp of all the considerations omitted from the "crime
equals punishment" equation. Warren suggests that the old man's
"three-day struggle to keep his dignity"8 is worth some respect and
has some value. I agree. I also believe that members of the
community implicitly understand that applying the straight "crime
equals punishment" equation in this case ignores such realistic and
relevant issues as the old man's love for his daughter, the absence
of a coherent frame of reference from which to evaluate this crime,
and the difficulty of balancing "justice" and other competing values
they prize as human beings-mercy, forgiveness, self-respect-in a
word, humanity. And, perhaps the community also believes that
the old man really is not a "bad guy" despite that fact that he
murdered a woman.
Why is this story relevant? In my view, the story illustrates
both the complete incoherence of the "crime equals punishment"
formula and its failure to account for the reasons why we sentence
or the purposes served by our sentencing decisions. Indeed, the
"crime equals punishment" equation disregards all the complex and
varied factors relevant to the criminal justice delivery system, and
replaces them with an apparently easy to apply, "one size fits all,"
mindless approach to sentencing criminal offenders. The "crime
equals punishment" equation is in reality the perfect complement
to American consumerism and the pop, fast-food, get-it-while-you-
can culture into which we have devolved at the end of the
Twentieth Century: make it easy, make it fast, don't make us think
too much, and, above all, remember that we have a short attention
span.
I suggest that our current system is not driven by a coherent
plan but instead by an apocalyptic myth that fails to fortify the




the developing crimini-culture. Simply stated, "crime equals
punishment" is not an integrated philosophy and contributes little
in terms of advancing our efforts to promote a safe, fair, and just
system that serves both the community and offender.
The "crime equals punishment" equation instead does
significant harm. By relying on this reflexive, unthinking equation,
we are deflected from the essential question that we should be
asking: Does our present criminal justice system ensure the safety
of the citizenry? This fundamental question will not disappear
merely because we choose to adopt the easy-to-execute "crime
equals punishment." Instead of the ready-made, drive-thru "crime
equals punishment" scheme, I suggest that we need a full-service
philosophy that seeks to answer the question of whether our
existing criminal justice system protects the citizenry and then
proceeds to ask and address other issues of the criminal justice
system.
Moral life does not thrive well in the absence of a socially
meaningful existence. Hence, we need an understood philosophy
that accounts for why we behave, why we err, why we punish those
who err, and the purposes served by our punishment. Society must
know of it, know it, and understand it or society will resist it. This
article outlines the parameters of just such a theory.
II. Should We Punish at All?
There is a genealogy for each philosophical theory.9 And, to
thoroughly test the legitimacy of a theory, one must trace this
genealogy to its inception. This is never more true than in testing
the philosophy of punishment. For, if there are no legitimate bases
for the punishment we impose, or if the bases are no longer valid,
then our punishment is no longer legitimate. Although this seems
quite complicated, the test is really quite simple. At each genera-
tion of our philosophy we must, knowing its origin, ask: Does the
philosophy still work?; Is it still consistent with other social systems
and goals?; and finally, Is it fair?
With regard to punishment, however, Americans are caught in
a parallax between the facile myth of punishment, to which our
penology clings, and the reality of life. We have an enormous
investment in the status quo, and confessing error is difficult.
9. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, On the Philosophy of Sentencing: Or, Why Punish?,
5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 237 (1996) (tracing the philosophical development of sentencing).
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Nonetheless, we must. Our preoccupation with, first, causing pain
to the offender and second, keeping the pain within constitutional
limits, creates an unnecessary philosophical tension. The shock of
really questioning our fundamental beliefs, however, is too much
for some to bear. Thus, the attitude prevails that if a sufficient
number of people are content with a simple response to criminal
behavior, and banished prisoners are so easy to ignore, why should
we challenge the myth? I respond: pragmatics. Because, like all
myths, this one is failing the test of both science and reality. Our
myth of punishment is broken.
Historically, we have relied on four explanations for why we
punish offenders: (1) deterrence; (2) containment; (3) rehabilita-
tion; and (4) retribution. At various times throughout American
history, each theory was posited as an explanation and justification
for why we punish. And, at various times, each theory provided
rational support for the punishment inflicted upon criminal
offenders. None of these theories, I submit, survives contemporary
critical scrutiny.
A. Deterrence
There are two different types of deterrence, general and
specific. General deterrence proceeds from the idea that by
punishing one offender for his acts we thereby discourage others
from doing the same because they will, theoretically, fear the same
result. In other words, by making an example of one offender, we
hope to insure that others behave. Specific deterrence relates to
the impact punishment has on the behavior of the punished
individual. We punish an offender for one act to convince him that
he must refrain from doing it again so to avoid suffering the
unpleasant consequences he now associates with that action.
At heart, deterrence is coercion by fear. Theoretically, fear is
supposed to force people to conform their behavior to the law.
People do not act out of respect for, or duty to, the law or from
their shared idea of the "rightness" of their behavior. Instead, they
fear some suffering if they do not act in accordance with the law.
Deterrence works. Empirically we know that because we each
have at some time feared something that caused us to alter our
behavior. But we do not know how it works, nor do we know what
it is about the rule or law itself-the detection, arrest, trial, and/or
punishment process-that actually deters. As such, neither general
nor specific deterrence can successfully function as a full-service
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theory that accounts for why we punish and the purposes to be
served by the decision to punish.
B. Containment
We imprison offenders to prevent them from committing other
crimes under the containment theory. In other words, we punish
offenders for the criminal actions that we believe they will commit.
Underlying this theory is the premise that once an individual
commits a crime, she forfeits any presumption of future innocence.
This theory raises some serious philosophical concerns. As a
baseline, we should be troubled by a theory that justifies punishing
offenders for something they have not done and may never do.
Indeed, containment rationalizes the continued incarceration of
criminals based on sheer speculation that those who have previous-
ly committed crimes will continue to do so. As a consequence, this
theory results in unnecessary containment where we incarcerate
those who may already be corrected, those who need no correction
at all, or those who can be corrected less expensively without
incarceration. In fact, there is mounting evidence that the
incarceration itself may perpetuate ill behavior.
C. Rehabilitation
Under the rehabilitation theory, the purpose of punishing
criminal offenders is to modify their behavior. At one time, many
believed that rehabilitation was the future of the criminal justice
system. Unfortunately, earlier rehabilitation theory was based
upon a flawed premise, that we could change them. Those who
favored this theory understood neither how to rehabilitate nor who
was capable of being rehabilitated. Moreover, our experiment with
the theory was scrapped too soon.
Today, rehabilitation is dead. Prison itself rehabilitates no one,
and criminal sentencing has dissociated itself from the goal of
rehabilitation. Indeed, if one wished to create a system to break
down cultural skills and social desire, to destroy and corrupt
morals, and to provide criminal instruction, one would have to
think very carefully about how to design a better institution for
doing so than the American prison. People-offenders includ-
ed-change because they see something in themselves they do not
like, and they reach down inside themselves and change it. Most
criminal offenders who change for the better do so in spite of
[Vol. 102:2
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prison not because of it. Clearly, rehabilitation does not rationalize
what we currently do to offenders.
D. Retribution
Retribution is revenge plain and simple."° We punish offend-
ers who violate the law because we are angry and want to get even.
Retribution is about power. It is about force. It is about repres-
sion. Under this theory, the offender's violation of the law
legitimates our vengeful punishment and absolves us of any
injustice or transgression we may commit upon her because the
offender deserves some suffering for violating the social order.
However, power creates the cruelty of indifference; force sacrifices
justice to achieve peace. And, any peace gained by these means is
always an uneasy one that is lost when the force of power is not
present.
We rationalize punishment by various means. But when the
penological smoke clears, punishment is psychologically for the
punisher. We like to punish, and our rationale for doing so is
really quite simple. The ugly truth is that we punish because it
makes us feel good to get even. I am opposed to any penological
expression of revenge.
III. How Do We Punish?
We punish primarily by imprisonment. Two hundred years ago
two significant events happened; both occurred in Philadelphia.11
The first was the result of a joint effort by Thomas Bond and
Benjamin Franklin-the development of the first hospital.
Unfortunately, it was primarily a place for the sick to die. The
second event was the result of efforts by the Quakers-the
development of the penitentiary. Fortunately, it was a place for
prisoners to do penance and become rehabilitated from their
wrongful ways. What has happened to these two institutions in the
past two hundred years?
Research has shaped the hospital into an institution of curing
rather than a mere repository for the sick. Far from being places
10. Retribution comes from the same place in the heart as revenge and in the same
place etymologically. Re means back, and tribuere means to pay. Retribution and revenge
are Humpty and Dumpty, and when they philosophically fall, they will shatter identically.
11. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Is Prison an Appropriate Response to Crime?, 40 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 677, 678 (1996) (tracing the development of the penitentiary).
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in which the physically ill die, hospitals are institutions wherein we
expect medical miracles and often get them. Hospitals and medical
science have surged forward together.
What happened to the prison? What happened to the
Philadelphia concept? The Quakers must be praised for the
institution of the American prison begun two hundred years ago.
We must be blamed for failing to improve on the idea, for failing
to sustain it and carry it forward. Instead of progressing, we
corrupted the best elements of the idea and adopted the worst.
Prison as a penalty in and of itself is a creature that was conceived
in an illicit union between politics and expediency instead of as a
means of correction. Our deficient performance stems from the
fact that we failed to advance our thinking beyond that which is
viscerally demanded by our society and politically conceded.
Progress stopped and, for some reason, reversed itself.
The "pain" of incarceration is theoretically supposed to be
sufficient: first, to punish and teach the offender a lesson and
second, to reinforce the social collagen of rules that civilize us.
Incarceration accomplishes neither purpose. The pain to the
offender is sufficient neither to punish him nor to reinforce the
morals of the law-abiding public. Indeed, statistics show that prison
accomplishes quite the opposite result. I submit that it was a grave
mistake to abandon that which formed the basis for the pris-
on-containment and correction-in favor of a perverted form of
banishment. I think it is time to look back and rejoin the path of
progress. It is time to rethink prison.
IV. What Is the Skeptic's View?
Essentially, the Skeptic's View is that we must move from an
offense-based theory, that is to say, punishment exclusively based
upon what one has done, toward an outcome-based approach which
strives to isolate the reasons for criminal behavior, imposes
remedies that seek to correct or palliate, and then accounts for its
results with the goal of preventing future harm. Hindsight is a
ruthless critic. But, to my way of thinking, there is no other way
to truly understand crime and the criminal offender than to identify
and analyze all the factors that affect behavior and then do
something about it and account for our actions in terms of the
outcome.
The most significant aspect of this perspective is that it
challenges us to stop thinking about the criminal justice system as
[Vol. 102:2
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relevant only after the offender has committed an infraction and we
have a victim. Instead, it commands us to re-conceptualize
antisocial behavior as a location upon a continuum along which lie
the rule or law, the temptation, the opportunity, the infraction, the
disposition, and then the remedy and post-remedial response. The
Skeptic's View requires us to concern ourselves with potential
offenders' behavior pre-trauma before they become criminals, and
with crimes before offenders commit them. It requires that we
stand outside a behavioral event and its given conditions, consider
them as contingent related facts, find out what went wrong and
where, imagine how they might have come out otherwise, and then
begin to change the predicate actuators.
Moreover, the Skeptic's View also demands that we play an
active post-crime role in the lives of offenders. In my view,
sentencing is not an end, it is a journey. This means more than
leaving offenders to deteriorate socially and psychologically in
prison. The Skeptic's View means devoting substantial efforts and
resources toward providing offenders with the necessary incentives
and tools for them to correct their behavior and to repair their lives.
I have no difficulty telling offenders, "You are all screwed up and
you are here until you change." But, the Skeptic's View would
willingly add, "And we are here to help you." It recognizes that
we cannot make change happen but acknowledges that we must
seek, expect, and facilitate positive change.
A. The Role of the Victim in the Skeptic's View
The Skeptic's View would place the victim near the center of
the criminal justice delivery system. I quickly add, however, for
reasons other than the superficial argumentum ad misericordiam
usually offered, which only provides an opportunity to vent a desire
for revenge. I view victim participation as substantive, indeed,
partially supplanting the state as the eminent party at trial and
requiring that the system and the offender confront the consequ-
ences of the crime and account for it in the sentence.
We determined long ago that the true victim of an offense is
the state not the one who actually suffers-she becomes society's
surrogate. Ostensibly the purpose of having the state as a party
was to intercept the potential for vengeance and recrimination that
would accompany violation of a victim. Actually, it may have been
to usurp the monetary restitution in favor of a fine to the state.
Theoretically we are supposed to be content with the state taking
1998]
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authority from the victim and controlling the balance of the act. In
reality, the fines go to the state, and revenge is taken by the state.
The victim is forgotten unless we use the experience to discover
something new. How else can we palliate the pain imposed upon
the extended penumbrae of victims and prevent future harm to
others?
Nonetheless, the victim is usually emotionally, and sometimes
physically, traumatized. I want victims and victims' rights groups
to participate because having a real role in punishing offenders is
not only helpful to the sentencers and correctional personnel but
is also therapeutic to the victim. I believe that psychologically,
sentencing should be the rough equivalent to the funeral and
interment of the deceased which allow the bereaved a significant
event to put the emotional trauma behind her. This cannot happen
unless participation is actual. Participation should not merely be
a forum to express emotions which may or may not affect the
sentences.
Under the present "crime equals punishment" equation, we
devote few resources to research the root causes of crime and
criminal behavior, and even when we do discover the causes, we do
little about them. Ignorance will serve us just fine if punishment
and vengeance are our primary goals. I suggest, however, that
ignoring the causes of crime and criminal behavior has taken us to
a point where prisons are a significant growth industry; we have a
whole segment of our economy built around crime and fear, and
our recidivism rates have run off the charts.
Understanding human behavior is largely a matter of under-
standing the multiple forces and powers that work together, or
struggle against each other, to affect the course of events.
Consequently, the Skeptic's View studies crime and criminal
behavior as if they were dreaded diseases of a healthy culture, in
an effort to change the course of events. The Skeptic's View
requires that we use scientific method not political rhetoric or
myth. Getting "tough" on crime is an empty slogan that does not
work. Almost anyone can meet and master pain. To change,
however, that is both challenging and frightening. We need to get
more than tough; we must get "smart" on crime so that we can
confront crime in all aspects of social life and then demand change.
Discovering and understanding the root causes of crime and
criminal behavior permit us to move to the second aspect of the
Skeptic's View: dedicating our social systems to intervention,
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palliation, and prevention. My vision for the criminal justice
system requires that we think about the system operating similar to
health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") in the health care
context. Indeed, it is my belief that the Twenty-first Century
criminal justice delivery system will closely resemble a "safety
maintenance organization" (an "SMO" if you will) committed to
providing pre-offense intervention and prevention, incarceration,
behavioral modification, and post-release observation and sup-
port." The HMO has been given a target population and the
mission: Keep them healthy. An SMO would likewise be given a
jurisdiction and a mission: Keep them safe. Boiled down to the
most fundamental level, under my view, the criminal justice system
must be dedicated to a simple mission: Keep the citizenry safe.
B. The Role of Experts in the Skeptic's View
The Skeptic's View is that justice must be therapeutic for the
immediate victim, the extended spectrum of victims, society, and
for the offender. Under the Skeptic's View, sentencing would
emphasize prevention and correction with punishment only an
element of the exercise. In concrete terms, this means that the
components of the criminal justice system and its personnel would
be taught to deal holistically with criminal offenders and confront
them as morally, educationally, socially, or biologically deficient
individuals. Moreover, as a pragmatic system, it would seek out
that which we can possibly correct and for whom we can require
correction. The Skeptic's View would uncover what is possible to
change and change it. It would recognize what is beyond the scope
of our knowledge and our tools and initiate a palliative response.
Towards this end, I would transform the sentencing phase of
the criminal proceeding into a "meeting" of experts from many
disciplines-sociologists, education professionals, psychologists,
victims and victim support organizations, ministers, priests, rabbis,
and even urban planners. These experts would become the court's
resources and would convene as the court's jury to help the court
and each other formulate an integrated social and penal response
to infractions based on a holistic view of the entire ecology of the
crime. Together, the courts and the panels would, where deemed
12. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Ten Commandments of Behavioral Genetic Data
and Criminology, JUDGES J., Summer 1997, at 59, 94 (explaining the view that the criminal
justice system should operate like an HMO).
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possible, work to develop appropriate remedial programs that
present offenders with real obligations and real opportunities to
change their behavior and to achieve the end goal of correcting the
behavior of criminal offenders at all points on the continuum
between pre-offense and post-release. As a consequence, this means
that sentences would be less focused on incarceration as an end in
itself and more focused on incarceration as a means to apply
methods designed either to return corrected offenders to society or,
if not released, as a means of humanely retaining them. Import-
antly, the Skeptic's View recognizes that we can learn as much
from failure as from success if we recognize failure, account for it,
adjust it, and seek to learn from one infraction how to prevent
others.
C. Political Rhetoric and the Skeptic's View
"Outcome" is one of the magic words that surfaces in any
contemporary reform effort. When we combine raw materials and
effort, we want to know if what comes out is better than what went
in. Even more elementary, however, we must know what we want
from offenders if we are to confront them with what they must
become before they can be reintroduced into society. We must
have a correction plan and an image of the end product we desire,
or we have no suitable measure of success. Significantly, under the
Skeptic's View, the criminal justice system can be built neither
upon some concatenation of moral abstractions nor upon hollow
political rhetoric. Instead, the criminal justice system must be part
of a solid foundation for building a workable community out of the
raw human material given it, and then it must, with other social
elements, be required to account for the results. If one were to ask
me what has happened to any of the thousands of persons whom
I have sentenced, I would have to answer, "I don't know." How
did they do in prison? "I don't know." Did they improve? "I
don't know." Did they commit other crimes? "I don't know." If
the criminal justice delivery system were required to account to the
public for its results, a revolution would take place in it.
Another buzz word is accountability. Unlike today, where the
criminal justice system need not account for the future actions of
its offenders, the Skeptic's View demands that we treat each crime
and criminal offender as part of a never-ending research process.
In this respect every sentence and every offender must be followed
closely to determine what worked and what did not, and the results
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must be made part of the data used to make future sentencing
decisions. Through this process we can avoid repeating sentencing
mistakes, and, importantly, we can keep the pressure on offenders
to behave. Indeed, by demanding that both the system and the
offender account for sentencing promises, progress and decisions,
acknowledge their failures, and study the reasons why particular
sentencing decisions result in particular outcomes, the Skeptic's
View moves us toward the end goal we must demand of our
sentencing philosophy-the correction of criminal offenders and the
prevention of criminal behavior.
D. The Death Penalty and the Skeptic's View
How about the ultimate penalty in the context of punish-
ment-what about death?13 We are most at peace with law when
it comports precisely with our individual visions of morality. If
society condemns as illegal that which we condemn as immoral; if
society's manifestation of justice coincides with our practical
notions of fairness; if society imposes only those sanctions that we
in good conscience could personally impose; then the rule of law is
easily understood and largely auto-enforced. When legislators
consciously observe these bounds, laws thus enacted enjoy wide
acceptance and a stamp of legitimacy.
Most of us feel a prima facie obligation to obey laws because,
psychologically, we seek equilibrium with the norms around us,
desire order and logic in our lives, and because we are, after all,
constituent elements of the government that enacted the laws. If
the legal duty imposed is also perceived to be a moral duty, that
prima facie obligation acquires the force of an imperative. If,
however, the law threatens, challenges, or contravenes a moral
tenet-or if the sanction for violators responds only to a passionate
demand for revenge or other infirm motivations-the law itself
creates a tension between civic duty and moral conviction and will
spawn an anxiety that is certain to erupt at cultural fracture-points.
Nowhere is this tension more evident than in our reaction to end-
of-life issues and legalized killing issues such as: abortion, euthana-
sia, physician-assisted suicide, organ and tissue farming, and the
dissection of clones. Likewise, no other penal issue is as socially




divisive in this last decade of the Twentieth Century as officially
sanctioned death.
The death penalty is the ultimate sanction and brings the
philosophy of punishment sharply into focus because of its drastic
and irreversible consequences. The death penalty is more,
however, than just a penological debate which few enter. It is also
more than just a morally divisive issue. The death penalty is more
because it has become the surrogate for society's frustration with
government's failure to protect it. Philosophers, theologians,
psychologists, and sociologists struggle with the propriety of killing
criminal offenders. The dilemma reaches each of us, and in the
face of it, we must reconcile our innermost moral, cultural, and
penological beliefs-all of which seem inextricably intertwined.
One may decline to express an opinion about the death option. No
one, I submit, is truly neutral about it.
The only traditional justification for the imposition of the death
penalty that withstands critical scrutiny is retribution. Society puts
criminal offenders to death because it wants revenge against those
who have committed heinous crimes and shattered the safety and
peace of society. Revenge is the reason most given by people who
support the death penalty;14 in some studies, one hundred percent
of the sample questioned gave revenge as the reason for supporting
the death penalty.
The Skeptic's View is Beccarian. It reasons that the death
penalty is probably penologically supportable, not in an attempt to
even the score, but as terminating the life of an offender who has
an unrejectable evil of such dimensions that civilized society can
tolerate no lesser response. In other words, viewed in its naked
reality, the death penalty is extermination. Thus, to kill, the state
must be prepared to evaluate a human life, place it at zero, and
take it. The state may be wrong in taking the life of some
offenders, but under penological scrutiny, the error is not the killing
of criminals and the taking of the lives; that is a moral and a
sociological judgment. Rather, the error is in following a practice
that fails to serve its penal purpose. Hence, the ultimate sanction
may be penologically supportable when nothing else works. Let me
give you examples of two such situations.
14. See Lois FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
MANDATORY SENTENCING 101 (1994).
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The first example arises in response to acts of terrorism,
genocide, or war, situations in which the killer denies the wrong-
ness of terror or killing itself. Indeed, he most likely believes it the
right thing to do and an act for which he will receive a sort of
heroic acclaim or eternal reward. Most crimes are motivated by
greed or passion. Terrorist acts are different. They are like acts of
war and motivated by factors that have little in common with
criminality. Accordingly, our best efforts to discover the causes of
criminal behavior and the dedication of our criminal justice system
to the treatment and correction of these causes are unlikely to have
any impact on preventing terrorist acts. Indeed, terrorists often
march to the beat of another's drum and are prepared to sacrifice
for whatever cause they believe. As such, terrorists are unlikely to
respond favorably to any theory of punishment or corrections, and
neither will likely be effective. Were we to do less than impose
death in such massive acts of violence against culture, the public
would wretch at the injustice.
The second example arises when, despite our best efforts to
treat and correct the behavior of criminal offenders, there remain
offenders who are totally outlaw, incapable of correction and who
present a continuing threat to the safety and well-being of the
citizenry. In such cases, where we have exhausted our efforts,
where the offender has committed a heinous crime and presents a
continuing menace to society, the death penalty is penologically
justified because there is nothing more we can do to fulfill our
mission.
E. The Criminally Insane and the Skeptic's View
What about insanity and guilt?15 For more than a hundred
years, the American criminal justice system has struggled with such
misleading terms as "insanity" and "diminished capacity" to mark
the boundaries between certain offenders who will be treated with
compassion and others who will be punished with vengeance.
Under the Skeptic's View, however, we can put an end to this
nonsense.
I suggest that we place the primary emphasis about state of
mind and receptivity to remedial measures where it belongs-at a
hearing to determine what remedy is to be employed and what
15. See, e.g., Richard Lowell Nygaard, On Responsibility: Or, the Insanity of Mental
Defenses and Punishment, 41 VILL. L. REV. 951 (1996).
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containing, correcting, or punishing measures are to be borne by
the offender. Indeed, in keeping with the treatment-based
approach of the Skeptic's View, the issue of mental capacity is most
relevant to the issue of how we treat and attempt to correct the
behavior of the criminal offender not whether the offender is guilty
of a crime.
You see, we all lie somewhere along a mental continuum. On
one end, beings are wholly incapable of rational acts; on the other,
theoretically, beings are entirely rational and calculating. A
person's position on the continuum, however, means little to the
equation of safety. We are all capable of antisocial acts. Where an
offender's mental condition does matter significantly, however, is
in determining if and how she can respond to punishment and/or
remedial measures and how the penological system can best ensure
that she presents no future threat to either herself or society. This
is the social high ground that the Skeptic's View attempts to take
and secure.
V. Do We Need the Skeptic's View?
I think so. Something is desperately wrong with our criminal
justice system. Recidivism, in some prisons running more than
eighty percent, is evidence that prison prepares its "alumni" for
crime while failing to impress upon them that they should not
return to their former criminal behavior. If we had an educational
system with failures running at this rate, we would demand change.
If our doctor used Nineteenth Century theories, science, and
practices, we would not tarry long in that office. Some change of
theory and practice is overdue.
When everyone is trying to behave, almost any criminal justice
theory will do because offenses are fewer and sentencing mistakes
more easily ignored or suppressed. But as the percentages change
and the numbers of those who have "beaten" the system increase,
the focus on what we do and why we do it becomes more acute,
and finding a more precise answer to the question of what to do
about crime becomes critical. Law in civilized society is a surrogate
for force, and every culture has norms that all must obey for a
peaceful progress. How we punish offenders must have a legiti-
mate reason, a defensible moral and philosophical base, and be
focused upon public safety and obedience to the law. This is the
essence of the Skeptic's View. I submit that any legitimate theory
of justice must satisfy these fundamental requirements.
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I do not intend here to present a conclusive argument for my
beliefs. I cannot because I too do not have the data, the research
results, and the knowledge. The question I have asked, "why
punish," cannot be answered on a priori grounds. It can be
answered only by studying the social consequences of our sentenc-
es. Reality is always more complicated and varied than the
theories by which we attempt to render it coherent. I speak as a
searcher, and I have tried to present a developmental, transitional,
and evolutionary model open to, anticipating, and welcoming our
developing understanding of human nature. And so, it is not easy.
Yet, at the same time, my Skeptic's View is simple: Correct if we
can and contain if we must.
The Skeptic's View is not about prisoner's rights; although, I
do not deny that prisoners have some rights. It is not about some
"bleeding heart" plan for saving the poor lost souls in prison;
although, I firmly believe that prisons contain many such people.
It is about community security and the obligation to consistently
strive towards that which makes it safer. Salus populi suprema lex
esto-Cicero's maxim: "The safety of the public shall be the first
law." I share his view. It may not be the place to end the inquiry.
It is, however, a place to begin.
VI. Conclusion
And so, I end this essay where I began it, having gotten here
on what has been, I know, a less-traveled course of thought.
Robert Penn Warren's observations are still true today. Upon
close examination, the "crime equals punishment" equation is too
simplistic to account for the myriad of motivations, emotions, and
the deeper sociological and psychological trends that account for
human behavior. Let us not be fooled by short-range statistics into
the facile assumption that all is well. All is not well. There is now
a sufficient volume of crime, it has its own momentum and a life of
its own. Success therein is when you get away with "it," whatever
"it" is. And, our prison system has become like a vast university
with a student body that is 1.5 million strong. This system counter-
educates its wards in anti-social and counter-cultural skills and
holds graduations daily. What are you going to do when one of
their graduates moves into your neighborhood? We must think
about that now. Time is running out.
I suggest that we need to reexamine our theory of criminal
justice from its philosophy up. I have outlined the parameters of
1998]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
just such a theory today-a new credo referred to as the Skeptic's
View. I do not seek utopia; however, I do seek an escape from
dystopia. I believe, nonetheless, that to see beyond the immediate
horizon requires an imaginative frame of reference. Accuse me of
being a penological idealist if you wish. To that, I plead "nolo
contendere." Daily, however, I am a pragmatist. I want to know
what works, and I reject any scheme that settles for less than what
is possible. The time has come for a new philosophy: one that
comes from a blueprint of wisdom, is built upon a foundation of
knowledge, is carried out by humane means, seeks corrective ends,
and strives for the purpose of securing the public's safety. The
Skeptic's View is big enough to be benevolent, secure enough to be
kind, honest enough to see failure, and pragmatic enough to do the
necessary.
In closing, let me leave you with one illustration. Who really
is this person Timothy McVeigh? We know that:
One day he was conceived by a mother and a father.
One day he was born.
One day he learned to crawl.
One day he learned to walk.
One day in diapers; one day in pants.
One day he left home for school.
One day he left school for work.
One day ... one day he detonated a bomb and killed 168
innocent men, women, and children, fellow humans whom he
did not even know, and, for which....
One day he will be put to death.
The question I keep asking over and over is this: What
happened to the baby boy? What happened to all the baby girls
and boys? We lost them somewhere, and we are continuing to lose
them, with disastrous consequences. I do not plead for a terrorist
who knows why he committed his evil deed. I plead for an
America that does not know why. And, I weep for an America
that doesn't care. Francis Bacon said "for in revenge a man gets
but even." That is not good enough for me. We control the house,
and I want better odds. I think we need to come out ahead.
Dispensing punishment, causing pain to offenders is not enough.
We must employ means to avert pain, to save victims, and to
prevent crime in the future. I am skeptical that the current system




Questioner: I have two questions: Do you think we will ever
allow the condemned to simply take a pill and end their own lives
rather than face execution? And, secondly, what do you think of
victimless crimes?
Nygaard: To the first question, no. As long as we seek
revenge and punishment for our offenders, we will not allow them
to take their own lives. Please understand, we are not just trying
to end a life but to avenge a killing. Recall with me that recently,
in another jurisdiction, a condemned man tried to commit suicide.
He was rushed to the hospital and resuscitated only to be executed
later. We want revenge. To allow one to gain the control over his
own life to the extent that he can control its termination frustrated
that goal.
Now, as to the second question. one usually refers to such
crimes as, for example marijuana use and prostitution, victimless
crimes. This first is too overlaid with moral and political overtones
now to be dealt with undetachedly. These factors must be dealt
with before the issue can be approached jurisprudentially.
Now, the second, prostitution, is not a victimless crime.
Indeed, this crime is unusual in that, in my view, the defendant is
also the victim. Where is the crime? I think we must question
what right does anyone have to buy the body of another? This to
me strikes at the heart of the hypocrisy of our macho, male
dominated criminal law system. The buyer of the body is the real
criminal isn't he? But that is a whole new lecture isn't it.
Questioner: How does rape fit into your theory?
Nygaard: I am not sure I know. I have always answered
letters I received from prisoners, and I have quite a collection of
them. An analysis "from the inside" if you will is that rapists
cannot be corrected and spend their time plotting how they will do
it again. I don't know if this "peer review" is accurate. I do know
16. The following is a compilation of the question and answer sessions following the
lectures upon which this essay is based. Some questions were duplicates, or quite similar,
so I have combined them. In doing so, however, I have strived to express precisely the
language of the question and the mood of the questioner.
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that rape is one of the most complex of crimes, with moral, power,
psychological, maleness/gender social overlays, with our cultural
sexual hierarchy thrown into the confusing equation. Many rapists
may be amenable to nothing. But, any analysis must cope with
these psychological, emotional, moral, and emotional overlays.
Questioner: I didn't understand your answer.
Nygaard: My response to specific crimes is that I don't know.
I would have to ask "what rape" or "what rapist?" My theory is
that the penal response should be tailored to the specific offender.
It may be that we cannot release him. Safety is the key.
Questioner (follow-up): How about chemical castration?
Nygaard: I think we have more to learn about that. I suspect,
however, that if we study offenses and offenders, we will find many
alternatives to just "doing time." These may be more pragmatic
and, indeed, prevent subsequent offenses. Many of them may be
chemical. We are controlling a lot of behavior that way now.
Schizophrenia, for example. Again, the point I keep hammering on
is research, testing, and accountability for the results. Look beyond
the immediate crime to prevent others.
Questioner: Aren't you concerned that you may be accused of
messing with people's minds, mind control?
Nygaard: I hope so. That is what correction should be about.
Look, we require that children attend school, and we mess with
their minds for twelve years. We call it education. We teach
science, mathematics, etc. Then we give them philosophy and
ethics in college, long after it can do much good. I suggest that we
begin to teach ethics and, yes, law in grade school. Many laws are
merely the embodiment of fundamental moral injunctions anyway.
I suggest that if we are going to require people to obey the laws,
it would be easier if we inculcate the morality that underlays them
and teach them as social expectations and requirements to be
performed not just as laws requiring outside enforcement. Social
skills and knowing cultural expectations are as important as many
other skills taught to our youngsters.
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Questioner (follow up): But, you seem to refer to intervention
before they commit crimes.
Nygaard: I am. But there are many ways to do that. A friend
of mine has done considerable research into urban planning and
architecture to prevent crimes. This is the ecology of crime I refer
to. But more, the Supreme Court recently decided a very interest-
ing case, Kansas v. Hendricks.17 By this decision, they authorized
the retention and treatment of one who had served his sentence
after the state showed that, if released, the offender posed harm to
himself and/or others."i When we decide to treat, not punish, new
options open to us. I think this case is of enormous importance to
sentencing reform.
Questioner: I have been a physician for twenty-six years,
sixteen of them as a psychiatrist, and I question your premise that
we can change behavior. I have worked with juvenile offenders,
and I have made such a minor percentage of change that, well...
Nygaard: At what age do you think we have to get to them?
Questioner: Very early. Maybe by one. It may just be
genetic.
Nygaard: First, I must say up front that I have a fundamental
disagreement with you. I think we can change behavior. My basis
is empirical. I have seen it in my sentencing. But therein leads to
my frustration also: the sentencing judge has insufficient tools.
Prison alone, punishment alone, is not enough. That's my point!
Many, perhaps most, sentences are now determined in the halls of
some legislature far removed from the crime and the criminal; the
judge merely imposes them. To progress, that at a minimum, must
change.
Let me say, that I would love to work with someone like you
to fashion real remedies that treat real people. The specialist with
the knowledge, the judge with the authority, and an institution in
which to do it.
17. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997)
18. See generally id.
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Questioner (follow-up): What happens if you fail? I mean, if
I make a mistake, I can be sued. What happens if you do?
Nygaard: Nothing. That is one of my points. We must
account for our actions, reactions, and remedies. Right now we do
not. No part of the system really does account for results. I think
we should start to do so. And when I say we, I include the
legislatures, which now have great control over the sentences-
sometimes fully determinative control.
Questioner (follow-up): I agree with you there.
Nygaard: Phew!
Questioner: I have been a physician for thirty-two years. I am
very dismayed that in your lecture, not in the Warren story or
anywhere, you don't talk about the victim. How about the victim?
Nygaard: You weren't paying attention! What did I say my
panel of experts would comprise? Not only victims but victim
rights organizations. I said the victims would be the centerpiece of
the sentencing decision and not for superficial reasons. But, I will
readily add that my focus is beyond the person who has already
been victimized. I view my most salient goal being to prevent
other victims.
Questioner (follow-up): I also wonder about changing; my
view is that it is all the influence from the family.
Nygaard: Fine. You may be right, or... (gesturing to the
doctor who felt it was genetic). How then do we create or recreate
family or some surrogate for it for the children who have none?
Questioner: That's just it, you cannot.
Nygaard: I'm not going to give up that easily. First, we can
continue to guess and just take stabs at what we consider to be the
problem. That is foolish. Or, we can, as I suggest, empanel experts
like you folks and really look for answers rather than trying to
manipulate results according to our own predilections. That's what
I want. I'm talking about a complete overhaul of the whole system.
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Finally, there is mounting evidence that the family, while
paramount, is only one integer in the equation, and social milieu
may play an even greater role. Perhaps, we could better invest our
education dollars in the four years before kindergarten rather than
the four years after high school. Maybe our Ph.D.s should teach
pre-school and grade school. That is something to think about.
Research, research, research, and more research. Study and
experiment. That is what I keep pressing. The reasons for crime
may be as legion as viruses. But, I suggest that we begin isolating
them, one at a time if necessary, and look for ways to treat,
palliate, or cure.
Questioner: I have spent many years in the ER (Emergency
Room). I have seen the [injured] victims. Have you ever done
that? Have you ever seen a murder victim die?
Nygaard: No, I never have. But what does that add to the
equation? I am against revenge. It is counter-productive. My
view is that someone must stand back from the event, take a
pragmatic look, and see how we can do better to prevent other
crimes. This is the most complex of questions to answer, usually
asked out of pity. But, that is not the point. We can only hope to
palliate her suffering. Pity is laudable, but it does nothing for the
penologist in terms of discovering causes and reasons for crime.
Questioner (follow-up): You sound like you have spent so
much time with the criminals that you are taking their side. Are
you sure you aren't doing that?
Nygaard: No, recall what I was saying. I am trying not to take
sides at all. I want a system of delivering justice for the victim, for
society, and for the offender. I will admit that I believe the
pressing need is to begin to deal effectively with the offender. She
or he is the one who will present the future threat to society.
Look, if we do not deal justly with the offender, whatever we do to
him cannot be the most productive because it will likely just harden
him. We can't do anything about the past. The lessons of history
are worth nothing unless we use them to inform the present and
prepare for the future. I have compassion for the victim; but I do
not let that cloud my judgment of what must be done now to
prevent other victims. I have an abhorrence for what some
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offenders have done. But, I try not to let that cloud my judgment
either. We must learn from one offender how to prevent other
crimes, how to prevent other persons from becoming offenders. It
is not much different from what you doctors do. Do you not hope
that in losing a fight to save one patient, you can learn something
about the disease that may save others? Sure you do. That's
medical research. Physicians and research hospitals are a paradigm
for what we can do. I want to see the same thing in penal
research.
Questioner (follow-up): I think when someone kills another,
he forfeits his right to life.
Nygaard: Let's analyze that. We have 22,000 to 25,000
homicides each year in America, and we sentence a minor




Questioner: I think we behave out of fear. I mean that I do
what's right because I am afraid of the consequences if I break the
law. Isn't that why we obey, we are afraid?
Nygaard: I am absolutely astounded! I think you are dead
wrong. As I said, deterrence accounts for something, but we don't
know what. Let me say that most people obey out of a sense of
duty, because it is the right thing to do, not out of fear of going to
jail. I disagree fundamentally with your premise. I think most of
us try to do what is right out of perhaps compassion for others or
a sense of shame of ourselves if we cheat on the rules of society.
I think that if we fear anything, it is that if we screw-up, we will be
exposed; as a result, our self-image and, I suppose, our reputations
will suffer.
But first, let me be fair, and let's step aside from this question
for a minute. Please, do not make the mistake of thinking of all
criminals as "them," bad guys from the other side of town. Sure,
we have our share of "them," and the pathological offender too.
But many crimes are committed by people who have shiny shoes,
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who live in our neighborhoods, wear ties, and work in air condi-
tioned offices. Many offenders are predators, yes. But, many
people just err. And remember, all were at one time first-offend-
ers, perhaps when we could have done something to and for them.
Some offenders are peremptory but neither corrupt nor criminal.
Let me ask you, do you remember the Ring of Gyges from
Plato's Republic? Gyges removed a magic ring from the corpse of
a giant. He discovered that by manipulating it, he could become
invisible. By the power of anonymity, he murdered the King,
seduced the Queen, and seized the throne. This is power! You
could walk into a jewelry store and take anything you wanted. You
could do anything you wanted. What would you do? Are you
virtuous or vile? Don't answer, please. Think about it though;
with the opportunity to perform good or evil-anonymously-what
would you do?
One more thing while we are here, not all the crooks go to jail.
In fact very few of them do. You look surprised. Think with me
about this. In 1990 Americans committed 35 million crimes, and
we sent only about 500,000 offenders to jail. Two years ago the
figure was 42.7 million-and not many more went to jail. A lot of
folks didn't fear anything. Right? Look, we can't have a cop on
every corner. We can't even depend upon the concept of law
enforcement to protect us. That's why I said we need a whole new
approach. A whole new philosophy. We need change from the
bottom up and the top down. We need to instill a desire or a duty
to obey, not depend upon a fear of disobedience. We need to
think about preventing 40 million crimes, not just punishing 500,000
offenders.
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